This post is in response to the comment from the Communications Specialist, from CIGI (Centre for International Governance Innovation) which you can see here. Besides the minor errors pointed out (and duly corrected) in the original post, I am going to respond to the most substantive claim, which is: (emphasis added)
…the assertion that CIGI, through the proposed agreement with York University, had any form of veto power over faculty selection or curriculum is wrong.
So, I prompted Declan (the Communications Specialist) to prove it, particularly by posting the agreement to confirm the assertion – considering journalists, and the Association of University teachers claimed the exact opposite. Since there has been no reply, or posting, I found the donor agreement myself. It’s conveniently posted on the CAUT website, here.
Time for some of my own independent confirmation.
It’s worth noting, at first, that this proposed deal was even more dubious – in terms of funding – than the Carleton deal; within the Carleton deal, the Riddell foundation would provide funding ever year provided Carleton did what was agreed to. In this deal, CIGI would provide funding every quarter – so, four times a year. This would automatically give CIGI a greater hand as there would have been more instances to say “no” to the funding if CIGI didn’t like the direction of York University. Otherwise, why not just give one giant lump, instead of 4 times a year for 10 years? Considering academic integrity doesn’t require gradual, 4 times a year, incremental funding from a think-tank. I mean, if that’s truly what CIGI wanted, why such an intentionally incremental funding scheme? Jeeze, even me the Preston Manning backed Clayton H. Riddell Carleton University deal wasn’t that steep! Answer me that, Declan.
Above is section 3 and 4 of the signed (null) contract between York University and CIGI. CIGI would provide quarterly funding, and according to section 4(a) and 4(c), CIGI would appoint 3 of the 5 members of the Steering Committee initially (and just 2 later on, presumably; when, I don’t know) – the limit of sitting for a chair is 10 years, which, is exactly when this proposed agreement was intended to expire. This alone would give CIGI (and its appointees) effective sway, if not control of the committee. Remember who has the money.
Now, let’s look at section 3, which explains the powers of the Steering Committee. Specifically 3(iv). Section 3(iv) says the Steering Committee has to approve the annual budget for the program.
Let’s think about what that means. Let’s mull over the previous facts. CIGI, in the deal, would provide quarterly funding to York Unversity. CIGI would appoint 3 out of the 5 members of the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee (with the majority of CIGI appointees) would approve the annual budget (largely paid for by CIGI). It’s not difficult to reach the conclusion CIGI (or its appointees), in some way, shape or form would have in some way, shape, or form veto power over the budget. And by extension, what that budget goes to pay for. If I am not mistaken, that would include staff and administration of any curriculum.
So, to address the correction from Declan Kelly… tell me, how did CIGI, in this agreement lack “any form of veto power“?